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THE WATERS OF ANTARCTICA: DO THEY BELONG TO
SOME STATES, NO STATES, OR ALL STATES?
LINDA A. MALONE*
ABSTRACT
Major issues and complexities arise when one is looking at the
international puzzle that is Antarctica. Despite being uninhabited year-
round and lacking substantial long-term international law rules for
sovereignty, states still try to claim their sovereignty over various parts
of Antarctica.1 The consortium of states under the Antarctica Treaty
System (“ATS”) then further aggravates these complexities, especially
when other states outside of the ATS have been arguing for different
regimes and approaches to dealing with Antarctica and resource exploi-
tation.2 Due to these major issues and a desperate need for a resolution
in times of global climate change, this Article delves into certain crucial
topics including the status of the waters off Antarctica, the overall
pertinence of the Law of the Sea Treaty, and the best approach to the
upcoming negotiations for a treaty on sustainable use of marine biologi-
cal diversity in areas outside national jurisdiction. This Article is not
meant to provide the absolute answer to this puzzle, but will, however,
analyze the various treaties, conventions, and ideas, and try to posit
some ways of looking at the puzzle.
The Article starts by discussing the ATS and its goal of trying to
preserve Antarctica. When it comes to the Antarctic waters, history
shows that when unregulated, the waters have faced extensive exploita-
tion of their resources, and some early attempts had been made to check
this.3 The Antarctic Treaty was adopted in 1959 and entered into force in
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1 Antarctic Treaty, Proclamation, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
2 Stephen Nicol,?Resource Exploitation in the Antarctic Region,?AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC
MAG. (May. 15, 2002), http://www.antarctica.gov.au/magazine/2001-2005/issue-3-autumn
-2002/feature/resource-exploitation-in-the-antarctic-region [https://perma.cc/ZP8V-M9BN].
3 Id.
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1961, and it consists of fifty-three parties with different statuses and
voting power—twenty-nine states have full power to participate in decision-
making.4 As the Article clearly points out and explains, the Treaty does
not alter or affect any of the previous claims of territorial sovereignty
and does not allow for new claims, or the expansion of those claims, while
in force. Additionally, when the Treaty was adopted in 1959, the law of
the sea was not yet being governed by the present United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) of 1982, but by various sepa-
rate treaties which were somewhat vague.5 The Article goes into detail
and discusses how the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 provided the framework
for subsequent treaties and protocols, which significantly added more
substance to, and made up, the ATS.
A key question analyzed in this Article is whether states’ territo-
rial claims give rise to claims to Antarctica’s waters. If so, to what extent,
and how exactly are some of these claims based? Some disputes and tension
have arisen between ATS and other states in regards to this. Is there
some form of joint sovereignty or condominium? To be further outlined,
the landmark UNCLOS brought to the global community a concrete and
comprehensive outline for the law of the sea, and a delineation of coastal
zones/boundaries has largely evolved into customary international law.
Yet, the Article looks at and poses one important question: do these bound-
aries under UNCLOS apply to Antarctica? If so, sovereignty claims must
be addressed and many different potential outcomes arise. However, to
whom is Antarctica open, and is it even available for territorial claims?
Who governs Antarctica? The Article explores these questions by looking
at claims from ATS and non-ATS parties. There has yet to be a compre-
hensive solution to the question of Antarctica but this Article raises signifi-
cant, valid points in attempting to address this key global situation that
is becoming increasingly important with today’s changing environment.
* * *
At the southernmost perimeter of the planet lies the international
law puzzle of Antarctica. Uninhabitable year-round and long-term, in-
ternational law rules for claims of sovereignty premised on habitation
have little or no relevance. Nevertheless, a number of states do claim
4 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1 (states include: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New
Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom).
5 Id.
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sovereignty over parts, but not all, of Antarctica.6 Further complicating
the analysis, a consortium of states (some making territorial claims and
some not) under the umbrella of the ATS have overseen Antarctica for
seventy years.7 This consortium has not gone unchallenged by other states
outside the ATS, with some arguing for a global regime for resource ex-
ploitation under the auspices of the United Nations (“UN”), and others
arguing for more of a “World Park” approach precluding any resource
exploitation.8 The legal issues are numerous and critically in need of reso-
lution as global changes in climate and scarcity of a wide range of world
resources increase the pressure to resolve what rights, if any, states have
to the continent and its resources on and off land. The very term “land”
is a misnomer for Antarctica, as most of what passes as terra firma in
Antarctica is a massive ice sheet.9
Do any states have a legal basis to claim parts of Antarctica? If so,
by what theories? Are the states making territorial claims justified in doing
so even if the legal theories for their claims are not recognized ones? If
Antarctica is not subject to claims of individual state sovereignty, what
legal regime applies? Is the ATS system controlling? Is it controlling only
for the state-parties to it, or are other states outside the system bound as
well? Are such states bound even if they object to the ATS system? If there
is no legal regime of global impact for Antarctica is there a legal vacuum?
What legal regime should govern the continent and its resources? With re-
spect to the valuable waters off Antarctica, does UNCLOS10 apply at all,
and if so, to what extent? The most recent complication is the drafting of a
global treaty under the UN’s auspices to govern marine biological diversity
in areas beyond national jurisdiction.11 Will these negotiations encompass
Antarctica, exclude Antarctica, or largely ignore the elephant in the room
as did the negotiations for UNCLOS?12 There are no definitive answers to
these questions in what seems to have been, to date, an almost implicit as-
sumption that there could be no majority agreement in any respect so the
6 Jill Grob, Note, Antarctica’s Frozen Territorial Claims: A Meltdown Proposal, 30 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 461, 465, 478–79, 481, 484 (2007).
7 Id. at 462.
8 Id. at 465.
9 See CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER & SUDHIR K. CHOPRA, THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 165
(1988).
10 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
11 G.A. Res. 69/292, ¶ 1 (June 19, 2015).
12 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 10.
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relative status quo of the ATS has continued in place, albeit with major
revisions since 1948.13 This issue avoidance is unlikely to continue, how-
ever, for the reasons noted above.
Specifically, this Article will focus on the status of the waters off of
Antarctica, the relevance of UNCLOS, and what approach to Antarctica
might be best in the upcoming negotiations for a treaty on sustainable
use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Although a proposal will be made to reconcile competing legal systems
as best to preserve the continent while allowing for equitable global
utilization, in the final analysis there is no dispositive legal answer to
the international puzzle that is Antarctica.
I. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
One outcome of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year
was a push to formulate a legal regime for Antarctica.14 The result was
the 1959 multilateral treaty, the rather brief Antarctic Treaty.15 The two
essential purposes of the treaty were to preserve Antarctica for interna-
tional scientific research and for peaceful purposes.16
The Southern Ocean, which circles the southernmost part of earth
uninterrupted by any land mass, has as its northern boundary the
Antarctic convergence, which is where the cold Antarctic waters meet the
warmer sub-Antarctic waters further to the north.17 This boundary is
very roughly 20–30 miles wide between 50–60? South Latitude.18 This is
one of several boundaries applicable to Antarctica. The devastating
impact historically of unregulated exploitation of the continent’s waters
13 See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T.
441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175, 11 I.L.M. 251.
14 See generally Christy Collis, Critical legal geographies of possession: Antarctica and the
International Geophysical Year 1957–1958, 75 GEOJOURNAL 387, 387–95 (2010) (discussing
the territorial politics of Antarctica).
15 See generally Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
16 Id. at Preamble (noting “it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes . . . . [a]cknowledging the substantial con-
tributions resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica.”). 
17 Jonah Young, Southern Ocean: Oceanographer’s Perspective, 33–34, ICE PRESS (Jan. 2,
2015).
18 Id. at 1; see also Southern Ocean, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2000), https://
www.encyclopedia.com/places/oceans-continents-and-polar-regions/oceans-and-con
tinents/southern-ocean [https://perma.cc/9EQG-6BDG].
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and marine life, including whales and fur seals, has been extensively
documented.19 The situation was even worse than that of the Arctic, as
Antarctica lacked not only a regional fisheries convention but states with
unquestioned sovereignty to control exploitation.20 The earliest check on
marine biological diversity was the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling,21 and the International Whaling Commission
which from 1946–1980 allowed whaling, but subject to quotas.22
The Antarctic Treaty was adopted in 1959 and entered into force
in 1961.23 There are fifty-three parties to the Treaty, although their
status and voting power varies dramatically.24 The original signatories
to the Treaty are the twelve countries that, during the International
Geophysical Year, were invited by the United States to participate in the
negotiations due to their involvement with, or activity in, the continent.25
These twelve countries are full Consultative Parties under Article IX
with decision-making powers.26 Since 1959 forty-one other countries have
acceded to the Treaty.27 Under Article IX(2) they may become full Con-
sultative Parties “by conducting substantial scientific research”28 in
19 Denzil G.M. Miller, Natasha M. Slicer, & Eugene Sabourenkov, An Action Framework
to Address Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, 6 AUSTL. J. OF MAR. &
OCEAN AFF. 2, 70, at 70–80 (2014); see also AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, Illegal fishing in the Southern
Ocean: the Problem, Practices and Perpetrators, AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC MAG., Winter 2003,
at 16, http://www.antarctica.gov.au/magazine/2001-2005/issue-5-winter-2003/feature/illegal-
fishing-in-the-southern-ocean-the-problem-practices-and-perpetrators [https://perma.cc
/S2YY-AVAG].
20 AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, Who Owns Antarctica, DEP’T. OF THE ENV’T AND ENERGY AUSTRALIAN
ANTARCTIC DIV. (June 19, 2018), http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-antarctica/people-in
-antarctica/who-owns-antarctica [https://perma.cc/GC6J-N6BW].
21 See generally International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, Dec. 2,
1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (enacted to “provide for the proper conservation of
whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”).
22 Gabe Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflec-
tions on the Future, 16 NAT. RES. LAW. 4, 543, 550–53 (1984).
23 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
24 SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, Antarctic Treaty: Parties, ANTARCTIC TREATY
SYS., https://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e&lang=e [https://perma.cc/74VR
-TQXS] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
25 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble (listing the “Governments of Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union
of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America” as parties).
26 Id. at art. 9; see also SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, supra note 24.
27 See SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, supra note 24.
28 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 9(2).
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Antarctica, and seventeen of the forty-one have so qualified.29 As a result,
there are twenty-nine state-parties fully entitled to participate in Treaty
meetings and to participate in decision-making.30 Amendments to the
core treaty may only be by unanimous agreement under Article XII.31
There are only a few provisions in the Treaty which shed any light
on jurisdictional conflicts and the binding nature of the Treaty outside
of its parties. The foundation for the agreement is Article IV, which
states nothing shall be interpreted in the Treaty as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previ-
ously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sov-
ereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting
Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result
of activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica,
or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party
as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any
other State’s right of or claim or basis of claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.32
In other words, the Treaty did not affect any pre-existing claims of
territorial sovereignty, either positively or negatively. Such claims remain,
but in a legal limbo so long as the Treaty governs. Article IV goes on to
say that nothing taking place while the Treaty is in force may support or
negate these claims, and no “new” claims or “enlargement[s] of an exist-
ing claim” may be asserted.33
The area to which the Treaty applies is prescribed as “[T]he area
south of 60? South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the
present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the
exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard
to the high seas within that area.”34 In 1959, the law of the sea was not
governed by the present UNCLOS of 1982, but by various separate
29 See SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, supra note 24.
30 Id.
31 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 12.
32 Id. at art. 4.
33 Id.
34 Id. at art. 6.
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treaties of 1958 on the high seas, the contiguous zone and territorial sea,
and the continental shelf.35 Whatever of these provisions at the time were
considered customary law, only the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
delineated a water boundary.36 Moreover, Article I of that Convention only
defined the “high seas” as the seas “not included in the territorial sea or
in the internal waters of a State,”37 a particularly unhelpful definition,
seeing as the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
specified no boundary for either.38 The original treaty did not dictate en-
vironmental protections directly other than prohibiting military activi-
ties, nuclear explosions, and radioactive waste disposal.39 Article IX(1)(f)
does provide for future consultations and measure regarding “preserva-
tion and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.”40
Under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty and meetings, the 1959
Treaty in practice has functioned as a framework for subsequent treaties
providing more detail to the ATS.41 As a result, the ATS now encompasses
the 1959 Treaty, the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals (“CCAS”), the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (“CCAMLR”), the 1964 Agreed Measures for
the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna (“Agreed Measures”) and
the 1991 Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (“Madrid Protocol”).42
For jurisdictional purposes, the most important provision is Article I of
CCAMLR. CCAMLR takes an ecosystem approach to conservation of
marine living resources, and applies “to the Antarctic marine living
resources of the area south of 60? South Latitude and to the Antarctic
marine living resources of the area between that latitude and the Antarctic
Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem” (emphasis
35 See UNCLOS, supra note10, at Preamble; Tullio Treves, Audiovisual Library of Inter-
national Law—1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, U.N. OFF. OF LEGAL AFF.
(OLA) (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html [https://perma.cc/C5QZ-ZYEW].
36 Convention on the High Seas art. 3, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82;
Treves, supra note 35 (signed in 1958 and entered into force in 1962).
37 Convention on the High Seas at art. 1.
38 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Treves, supra note 35 (signed in 1958 and entered into
force in 1964).
39 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 1, 5.
40 Id. at art. 9(1)(f).
41 Id. at art. 9.
42 Antarctic Treaty: Related Agreements, ANTARCTIC TREATY SYS., https://www.ats.aq/e/ats
_related.htm [https://perma.cc/3NE8-GRYW] (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
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added).43 CCAMLR, at least for marine living resources, extends the ATS’s
reach beyond the 60?South Latitude to the boundary of the Antarctic
Convergence.44 Article I(4) goes on to define the Convergence as a line
“joining the following points along parallels of latitude and meridians of
longitude: 50?S,0?; 50?S, 30?E; 45?S, 30?E; 45?S, 80?E; 55?S, 80?E;
55?S, 150?E; 60?S, 150?E; 60?S, 50?W; 50?S, 50?W; 50?S, 0?.”45
In 1991, largely in response to the looming threat of mineral ex-
ploitation in the Antarctic, the ATS parties promulgated the 1991 Madrid
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.46 Article
I(b) defined the “Antarctic Treaty area” again as being limited to the
boundary in Article VI of the original treaty.47 As the title indicated, the
principal purpose of the Protocol was to provide a more comprehensive
and coordinated environmental regime than that established by the prior
agreements and recommendations of the Consultative Parties.48 Towards
that end, Article 7 prohibits “[a]ny activity relating to mineral resources,
other than scientific research.”49 Article 13 of the Protocol repeats Article
X of the Antarctic Treaty, that every Party shall exert “appropriate ef-
forts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that
no one engages in any activity contrary to” these agreements.50
Article 25 of the Protocol contains the extremely complicated
provisions for modification or amendment of the Protocol, clearly de-
signed to make lifting the mining ban difficult at best.51 Fifty years after
the Protocol enters into force, any proposed modification or amendment
to the Protocol must be adopted by a majority of the Parties, including
three-fourths of the Consultative Parties at the time of adoption of the
Protocol.52 It only enters into force, however, after three-fourths of Con-
sultative Parties have fully accepted the amendment, including all of the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties at the time of the Protocol’s adop-
tion.53 In addition, the ban on mineral activities continues unless there
43 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art. 1, opened
for signature May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47.
44 Id. at art. 1(1).
45 Id. at art. 1(4).
46 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 13.
47 Id. at art. 1(b).
48 Id. at art. 2 (“The Parties commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the
Antarctic environment . . . .”).
49 Id. at art. 7.
50 Id. at art. 13 (emphasis added).
51 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 25.
52 Id. at art. 25(2)–(3).
53 Id. at art. 25(4).
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is in force an alternative, binding legal regime on mineral resource
activities “that includes an agreed means for determining whether, and,
if so, under which conditions, any such activities would be acceptable.”54
II. THE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND CLAIMANTS
The seven so-called “claimant” states are the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, Chile, and Argentina.55 The
“non-claimant” states, those which had engaged in research and explora-
tion in Antarctica by 1959 but would not assert or recognize territorial
claims, are Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United
States.56 An in-depth analysis of the territorial claims, and the legitimacy
of the legal theories and factual basis with respect to each state’s claims,
is beyond the scope of this Article (even assuming Antarctica is a legiti-
mate object for any territorial claim). Rather, the focus is whether, or to
what extent, territorial claims would even give rise to claims to the
waters off Antarctica. Even a cursory glance at the list of claimant states
is perplexing as to how some of these claims are based. The prevalent
principles asserted are discovery, occupation, propinquity, the sector
theory, and uti posseditis.57 The sturdiest legal theory of effective occupa-
tion is inherently ill-suited to Antarctica as possession must be actual,
continuous, and useful.58 Even if the decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Eastern Greenland59 case may be interpreted
as loosening these requirements for difficult environments, a question-
able interpretation at best, the size of the continent, as well as the
limited nature and geographic extent of activities, makes for a difficult
claim. Discovery is not generally accepted as a basis since at least the
Island of Palmas60 case, nor does the theory assist in determining com-
peting claims or the geographical extent of a claim of discovery. Propin-
quity, the theory that a state which acquires sovereignty over part of a
territory does so over the entire territory,61 fails on both the initial
54 Id. at art. 25(5)(a).
55 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble.
56 Id.
57 See generally Douglas M. Zang, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Minerals Convention, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 722, 735–51 (1991) (analyzing territorial claims and Antarctic jurisdiction).
58 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) 2 UNRIAA 829, 839 (1928).
59 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 22
(Apr. 5).
60 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) 2 UNRIAA 829 (1928).
61 Elmer Plischke, Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic (1950), https://collections.dartmouth
.edu/arctica-beta/html/EA11-03.html [https://perma.cc/7N9Z-WP9V].
62 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:53
question of how to gain sovereignty and how to reconcile competing
claims of partial claimant states. Uti possidetis is premised on the theory
that Chile and Argentina may claim under the 1493 Papal Bull dividing
the world between Spain and Portugal, a theory which never had nor
gained wide acceptance.62 The sector theory, first developed with respect
to the Arctic region, posited that states whose territory extended beyond
the Arctic Circle have sovereignty over a triangular sector formed by the
eastern and western limits of the state culminating at a point at the
North Pole.63 Although the territorial claims in Antarctica have been
modeled on triangular sectors, there are a number of problems in appli-
cability to Antarctica: no state extends below the Antarctic Circle; the
theory conflicts with the concept of effective occupation; and the theory
conflicts with freedom of the high seas in the waters in a sector drawn
from Antarctica, which would unquestionably qualify as the high seas.64
For the purposes of this analysis, none of these theories illuminates how
to reconcile the competing and overlapping territorial claims, or the large
sections of Antarctica which no state claims or possibly could as a practi-
cal matter of uninhabitability.
There is also the question of whether some combination of the
Parties or the Consultative Parties exert some form of joint sovereignty
over Antarctica, or at least the parts covered by their activities or territo-
rial claims. Aside from the individual state claims, has a de facto “condo-
minium” been established over all or part of Antarctica? A condominium
is defined as territory “under the joint tenancy of two or more States,
these several States exercising sovereignty conjointly over it, and over
the individuals living thereon.”65 Several problems are evident from that
black-letter law definition. Obviously, Antarctica does not present the
usual situation of land with “individuals living thereon.”66 In addition,
the ATS parties themselves have suspended claims of sovereignty and
their legitimacy,67 which hardly qualifies as exercising sovereignty con-
jointly over Antarctica, but perhaps that only signifies that any condo-
minium would not be a de jure condominium but a de facto one. It would
62 See Zang, supra note 57, at 744–45 (“the Antarctic claims of Chile and Argentina are
legitimate as a matter of historic right . . . . This arcane theory has never gained wide
acceptance.”).
63 Id. at 743–44.
64 Id.
65 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 453 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1962)
(original emphasis omitted).
66 Id.
67 Anna Homan, Maritime Zones in Antarctica, 20 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 70 (2006).
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also seem that in order for any condominium to be recognized under in-
ternational law, there must be a determination that the condominium
states have a legitimate legal claim to sovereignty, returning to the prob-
lematic legal bases for the claimant states to portions of Antarctica.
There also remains the question of whether such a condominium would be
entitled to assert sovereignty over all of Antarctica, including its waters
and the expanse of Antarctica that no state claims. These questions are
inextricably tangled up in the question of what legal regime is estab-
lished by the ATS and whether it is binding on non-ATS states as dis-
cussed below.68
III. ANTARCTICA AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA TREATY
In 1982, the landmark UNCLOS for the first time provided a single,
comprehensive framework for the law of the sea for the global commu-
nity. Some of the provisions were similar or identical to those in the 1958
Conventions, merely reflecting customary international law, but many
more were entirely new and innovative.69 The Convention was also remark-
able for finally delineating the reach of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the continental shelf and the high seas, and doing so in reference
to nautical mile limitations.70 The Convention had entirely new legal
frameworks for marine pollution, species preservation, dispute resolution,
and the deep seabed.71 It was quite simply a remarkable achievement in
clarifying and advancing the law of the sea regime.
As of 2017, virtually every state (that is, 168 states) is party to the
Convention.72 Having gone into effect in 1994,73 it is accepted as the gov-
erning law of the sea and largely evolved into customary international
68 See infra notes 128–44 and accompanying text.
69 See UNCLOS, supra note 10; see also Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the
Sea: Office of Legal Affairs—United Nations, The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, UNITED NATIONS (2012), http://www.un.org/depts/los
/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Third%20Conference
[https://perma.cc/WH68-2TDH].
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 UNCLOS, supra note 10, at 397–98. See also Chapter XXI—Law of the Sea: United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N.T.C. (updated as of August 25, 2018),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chap
ter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/L7XN-PTYY].
73 UNCLOS supra note 10, at 397.
64 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:53
law.74 Even the United States, which is not a party to the Convention,
refers formally to the requirements of the Convention and has based its
own delineation of its territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental
shelf on the convention’s definitions and delineations.75
The essential delineations of a state’s coastal zones are as follows.
The territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles from the baseline of the
coastal state as the baseline is itself to be determined under the Conven-
tion.76 The territorial sea is virtually an extension of the land territory
of the state with full sovereign rights, subject primarily to the right of
innocent passage for other states through those waters.77 The contiguous
zone extends an additional twelve nautical miles out from the baseline
or twenty-four nautical miles, for the state to enforce its customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws within its territorial sea.78 Despite its over
300 articles, nine annexes, and multiple implementation agreements, the
contiguous zone is addressed only in Article 33, and briefly at that.79 It
essentially repeats the 1958 provision on the contiguous zone adding the
twenty-four-nautical-mile limit.80 Far more important is the Convention’s
establishment of an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles
out from the coastal state’s baseline.81 Within this zone, other states have
essentially the freedom of the high seas with respect to passage in those
waters, but the coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights with respect to
living and non-living resources.82 The high seas are those waters beyond
any coastal state’s jurisdiction of 200 nautical miles through which all
states have the freedom of navigation, overflight, fishing, and scientific
research, among other freedoms (or as Article 87 states, “inter alia”).83
74 See John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back
From Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 12 (2006) (discussing UNCLOS
as “customary international law”).
75 See id. at 13–16 (providing examples of the United States courts applying Convention
principles).
76 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 3 (“Every State has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from
baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”).
77 See id. at art. 2, art. 17.
78 Id. at art. 33.
79 Id.
80 Compare id. with Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 24.
81 UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 57.
82 Id. at art. 56–57.
83 Id. at art. 87.
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Underneath ocean waters, UNCLOS also governs the continental
shelf and the contiguous zone.84 The continental shelf extends to the
outer edge of the coastal state’s continental margin or at the least 350
nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline.85 An outer limit is estab-
lished for states with expansive shelves to the continental margin of 350
nautical miles from the baseline or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre
isobath, which is a line drawn at the depth of 2,500 metres.86 The deep sea-
bed is the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, the underlying equiva-
lent of the high seas.87 The regime governing the deep seabed, however, was
an entirely new legal framework and a controversial one, which, at least
initially, was responsible for the United States’ refusal to ratify the treaty.88
The deep seabed provisions of UNCLOS are relevant to Antarctica
theoretically, insofar as they are predicated on the legal concept of “the
common heritage of mankind.”89 As early as 1968, the United Nations
General Assembly had approved of the concept that the General Assem-
bly declare the seabed, the ocean floor, and its resources as the “common
heritage of mankind.”90 It would subsequently develop that the agreement
on this designation for the seabed did not include agreement on what the
designation might signify under international law.91 Essentially, the agree-
ment on the designation was driven by many of the developing countries
and lesser-developed countries opposing the possibility of unrestrained
exploitation of seabed resources by the handful of developed countries who
could do so, without participation and resource-sharing for the global
community.92 Unresolved, and hotly contested in the following decades,
84 See id. at art. 2.
85 Id. at art. 76.
86 Id.
87 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 136–37.
88 See Kathryn Surace-Smith, United States Activity Outside of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: Deep Seabed Mining and Transit Passage, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1032, 1033, 1040 (1984).
89 See UNCLOS, supra note 10, at art. 136.
90 G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) at 15 (1968). See also Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The
Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV.
207, 209–11 (1992) (providing a short historical background for the “common heritage of
mankind” concept).
91 See generally Harry, supra note 90 (discussing the conflicting legal interpretations of
the common-heritage concept, and the implications of these interpretations on the inter-
national legal status of seabeds).
92 See Jennifer Frakes, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed,
Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?,
21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 415–18 (2003).
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would be how the global community would benefit from the resources of
the seabed and the obligations of the developed countries in implementing
the common heritage.93 The concept that areas of the global commons—
whether the seabed, the high seas, outer space, or celestial bodies—are a
common heritage of mankind would resurface in the context of Antarctica
as a common heritage of mankind.94
These boundaries under UNCLOS, as important as they otherwise
are, are significant for Antarctica only if they apply to Antarctica. Whether
they do or do not is not evident on the face of the expansive treaty, as it
never mentions Antarctica.95 Whether this glaring omission was intended
to indicate exclusion, was inadvertent, or was a reflection of an inability to
reach a consensus, necessitates a messy inquiry into the travaux prepara-
toires of the Convention and conflicting statements by state representa-
tives as to coverage of Antarctica.96 Politically, injecting any determinative
inquiry into the legal status of Antarctica as to governance by the ATS or
the global community would have been a thorny issue with the potential
to derail the already complex negotiations and compromises necessary
for UNCLOS.97
If UNCLOS applies, or at some point is applied, to Antarctica, the
sovereignty claims and legitimacy, or lack thereof, can no longer be
ignored. Attribution of coastal waters to any state is dependent upon the
legitimate status of that state as a coastal state.98 Several dramatically
different outcomes may result:
1. If no territorial claims are recognized, either due to
their illegitimacy or acceptance of Antarctica as the
“common heritage of mankind” in a “World Park”
sense, then the waters off Antarctica can be charac-
terized as the high seas under UNCLOS. Ironically,
the most protective designation for the continent is
the least protective of the waters off Antarctica,
opening all those waters to the freedoms of the
high seas.
93 See id. at 419–20.
94 See id.
95 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 10.
96 See generally id.
97 See Treves, supra note 35, at 1–3.
98 See id. at art. 2.
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2. If no territorial claims are recognized and Antarctica
is viewed as the “belonging to everyone” common
heritage of mankind, the possibility arises for the
negotiation of an agreement to administer the wa-
ters off Antarctica with an international mecha-
nism as with the deep seabed under UNCLOS.
3. If any territorial claims are recognized (or asserted
forcefully), a claimant state may assert its authority
to claim the full reach of a territorial sea, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone, a continental shelf,
and an expanded continental shelf under UNCLOS.
Given the unclaimed expanses of Antarctica, the
high seas boundary would fluctuate from 200 miles
from the coastal baseline to equivalency with the
baseline. The reach of a state claim to an expanded
continental shelf could reach as far as 350 nautical
miles from the baseline or 100 nautical miles from
the 2,500 metre isobaths, whichever is farther.
4. If any territorial claims are recognized but
UNCLOS is not applicable, the state claims to the
offshore waters would be those within the triangu-
lar vector to the 60E latitude, with any additional
reach provided by CCAMLR’s ecosystem approach.
With respect to the fourth possibility above, the unique position of
Norway with respect to its Antarctic claims deserves mention. Although
it was the Norwegian Amundsen who first reached the South Pole,
Norway has not claimed either the full extent of the land mass or waters
to which it would be entitled under the vector approach.99 It has taken
this position so as not to lend any recognition to the vector claims made
by Russia in the Arctic which work to the detriment of Norway.100 Once
again, the question becomes one of what is or is not accepted customary
international law. If some territorial claims are recognized as valid, how
are the extent of those claims to be determined? Aside from the overlap-
ping nature of those claims, is the vector approach a generally accepted
method of boundary delineation for the polar areas?
99 See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Interests and Policy in the
Antarctic, 32 MELD. ST. 1, 12, 17 (2016).
100 See Øystein Jensen & Svein Vigeland Rottem, The Politics of Security and Interna-
tional Law in Norway’s Arctic Waters, 46 POLAR RECORD 75, 77–78 (2010).
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IV. IS ANTARCTICA EVEN SUBJECT TO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
In December of 1989 the United Nations General Assembly passed
a Resolution on the Question of Antarctica.101 The resolution was the
culmination of an earlier study by the Secretary-General and a resultant
1984 General Assembly Resolution to include the question of Antarctica
on its agenda.102 Both resolutions reflected the dismay of a number of
states at their exclusion from the Antarctica “club.” The precise legal
parameters of the “common heritage of mankind” in 1984 were no more
clear with respect to Antarctica than they were with respect to the seabed
prior to UNCLOS in 1982.
Conceptually, the common heritage of mankind has been de-
scribed as including six basic elements.103 First, areas designated as the
common heritage are not subject to appropriation, either as to the area
itself or its resources, by any person or state.104 Appropriation is prohib-
ited because the area and its resources belong to the global community and
that community is entitled to share its management.105 Third, economic
benefits from the area’s resources, if exploited, must be shared interna-
tionally and equitably.106 Fourth, the area may only be used for peaceful
purposes.107 Similarly, scientific research in the area is open to the entire
community.108 Finally, and less clearly, the concept may necessitate tech-
nology transfer and other support from the developed countries to lesser
developed countries in order to implement meaningfully the sharing of
the common heritage.109
The barest outline of the common heritage of mankind concept re-
veals that “the devil is in the details” in applying the concept to any global
commons. The core question is whether the common heritage of mankind
necessarily entails resource exploitation, or whether equitable sharing
of a global commons should be free of any resource exploitation. The
101 G.A. Res. 48/80 A, Question of Antarctica (Dec. 16, 1993); G.A. Res. 44/124 A, Question
of Antarctica (Dec. 15, 1989).
102 G.A. Res. 44/124 A, Question of Antarctica (Dec. 15, 1989).
103 See J.M. Spectar, Saving the Ice Princess: NGOs, Antarctica & International Law in
the New Millennium, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 57, 59–60 (1999).
104 Id. at 59.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 59–60.
107 Id. at 60.
108 Id.
109 Spectar, supra note 103, at 60.
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latter view has been characterized as equating the common heritage of
mankind with the concept of a “World Park,” in which the area is preserved
in its natural state for global enjoyment free of economic/commercial utili-
zation.110 Under the resource-exploitation view, a further split developed
among the states advocating for some form of resource exploitation.
Developed countries, even though open to the possibility of some form of
shared management, tended to view the best legal regime as one which
coordinated exploitation globally, but with minimal interference other
than to prescribe processes and environmental safeguards (what will
hereinafter be referred to as the “belonging to no one” common heritage).111
Lesser developed countries, seeking their own share in the new interna-
tional economic order, sought a legal regime in which they had not only
full participation in decision-making, but full, equitable sharing of the
economic benefits and technological advances from the area with all the
responsibilities that would entail for developed countries to developing
countries (as in “belonging to everyone” common heritage).112 The tension
between these three views for the deep seabed would lead eventually in
UNCLOS to acceptance of the “belonging to everyone” common heritage
approach, but not until after intense negotiations, multiple additional
implementation agreements, and defection (most notably the United
States) from UNCLOS altogether.113 Ironically, the most hotly contested
part of UNCLOS in the following years would become less contentious,
as the anticipated profitability of deep seabed mining did not meet expec-
tations.114 The most basic tenet of the common heritage of mankind
concept, however, is rejection of any state’s claims of sovereignty over the
area, much less over its resources.
In the 1989 General Assembly resolution, the General Assembly
departed from the “belonging to everyone” approach in UNCLOS for the
deep seabed to the “World Park” approach for Antarctica.115 The resolution
was adopted in response to negotiations in the ATS for an ATS treaty
managing resource exploitation in Antarctica, known as the 1988 Con-
vention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities or
110 See id. at 89–94.
111 See Frakes, supra note 92, at 411 (“Common heritage spaces are legally owned by no
one.”).
112 Id. at 414–15.
113 Id. at 416–19.
114 Id. at 418–20.
115 World Park Antarctica, GREENPEACE (2015), http://www.greenpeace.org/international
/Templates/Planet3/Pages/DetailPage.aspx?id=18409&epslanguage=en [https://perma
.cc/2RSW-Z9N7].
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“CRAMRA.”116 CRAMRA would never enter into force, as Australia and
France announced they would only support the “World Park” approach,
and CRAMRA’s ratification required their support.117 The final nail in
CRAMRA’s coffin was when the U.S. House of Representatives approved
a ban on mining in Antarctica, indicating a shift in the U.S.’s prior pro-
exploitation position.118 CRAMRA would, in the interim, prompt the
“World Park” response in the 1989 General Assembly resolution in protest
to what many states saw as an exclusionary attempt by the ATS states
to claim the resources of Antarctica for themselves.
The resolution unequivocally referred to Antarctica as a World
Park, and urged all states to “support all efforts to ban prospecting and
mining in and around Antarctica.”119 Negotiations to establish Antarctica
“as a nature reserve or world park” in order to “ensure the protection and
conservation of its environment and its dependent ecosystems for the
benefit of all mankind” must be conducted “with the full participation of
all members of the international community.”120 In doing so, Antarctica
was to be placed under the management of the entire global community
and used for “the benefit of mankind as a whole.”121 The 1989 Resolution
was as outright a condemnation of the ATS as diplomacy would allow. It
criticized the ATS states for failing to include the Secretary-General of
the UN in its ATS meetings despite numerous UN resolutions calling for
them to do so.122 Declaring that Antarctica was subject only to a global
management regime was a rejection of the legal legitimacy of the entire
ATS. If the ATS parties were to allow mining in Antarctica, the General
Assembly had made it clear that its members would not accept the legal-
ity of the regime.
116 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, Introductory
Note, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15282
.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4W7-MUXJ].
117 Sam Blay & Ben Tsamenyi, Australia and the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), POLAR RECORD, 195, 195, 201 (1990), https://ro
.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article
=1238&context=lhapapers [https://perma.cc/6MAX-UXBC].
118 Alan Riding, Pact Bans Oil Exploration in Antarctic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1991), http://
www.nytimes.com/1991/10/05/world/pact-bans-oil-exploration-in-antarctic.html
[https://perma.cc/9QTW-6AP2].
119 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of St., United States Leads Antarctic Treaty Support for Ban
on Mining Activities (June 9, 2016).
120 G.A. Res. 48/80 A, Question of Antarctica (Dec. 16, 1993); G.A. Res. 44/124 A, Question
of Antarctica (Dec. 15, 1989).
121 G.A. Res. 44/124 A, Question of Antarctica (Dec. 15, 1989).
122 Id.
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Following the failure of CRAMRA, the ATS parties would adopt
the 1991 Madrid Protocol discussed above.123 The Protocol, with its fifty-
year ban on mining, avoided a direct showdown between the ATS parties
and the General Assembly.124 The Protocol, however, affirmed the posi-
tion of the ATS parties that resource exploitation in Antarctica was a
question for their determination, without the full involvement of the
international community.125 This point was emphasized by Article 4(2),
which said nothing in the Protocol “shall derogate from the rights and
obligations of the Parties to this Protocol under the other international
instruments in force within the Antarctic Treaty System.”126 There is no
mention of the “common heritage of mankind” in the Protocol.127 The
mining ban thus postponed a fundamental difference of opinion between
the ATS parties and the global community over who had the legal authority
to manage Antarctica.
A. At Present Is There a Generally Accepted Legal Regime Which
Governs Antarctica with Globally Applicable Legal
Responsibilities?
As with so many international law questions, the initial answer
to the above question varies depending upon whom is asked. Certainly,
the ATS parties would assert that the ATS governs Antarctica for the
global community. In political support of that proposition the parties could
point to the significant achievement of the ATS for over sixty years in quell-
ing territorial claims by the claimant states and doing much to preserve
the fragile Antarctic environment. Most, if not all, states not included in
the ATS (and some non-consultative parties who are in the ATS) would
assert that the only legitimate legal regime for Antarctica is the global
regime (presumably, but not necessarily as a World Park) yet to be for-
mulated. An objective analysis necessitates an in-depth analysis of the
law of treaties and the formulation of customary international law, with
major implications for any claim of the ATS parties as a group to sover-
eignty over Antarctica.
123 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 13.
124 Id. at art. 7.
125 Id. at art. 8.
126 Id. at art. 4.
127 See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 13.
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Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only parties
to a treaty are bound by a treaty.128 All parties to a treaty must observe
it in good faith.129 The provisions of this “treaty on treaties” are generally
viewed as customary international law, binding even upon those few
states which are not a party to it (such as the United States, which refers
to it for legal requirements as it does with UNCLOS).130 Article 4 of the
Vienna Convention addresses treaties and third states.131 Article 34 ex-
presses the general rule that a treaty “does not create either obligations or
rights for a third state without its consent.”132 This Part goes on to empha-
size that no treaty creates an obligation for a non-party state without
that state’s consent.133 Moreover, only if the parties to a treaty intend to
create a right in non-party states does a treaty do so, and then with the
non-state parties’ consent.134 There is no question that the ATS parties
have not intended to create any rights in non-party states as a matter of
treaty law.
Customary international law, however, may evolve from treaty
provisions generally accepted as international law within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.135 Cus-
tom emanating from treaty provisions binds parties and non-parties to
the treaty,136 subject perhaps to the “persistent objector” exception, an
exception not widely accepted as such. Despite having excluded most of
the international community from the ATS decision-making, the Consul-
tative Parties would argue that the nearly sixty-year functioning of the
ATS has established a globally enforceable body of customary interna-
tional law.137 A less assertive argument from the Consultative Parties’
perspective would be that the ATS has established regional customary
law that governs Antarctica, but that begs the question of how that
128 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 18232
UNTS 332 (1980).
129 Id. at art. 26.
130 Id. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://www
.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/4AUN-QJZ9].
131 United Nations, supra note 128, at art. 4.
132 Id. at art. 34.
133 Id. at art. 35.
134 Id.
135 Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch 2. art. 36 ¶ 2.
136 Id. art. 63.
137 Davor Vidas, IMPLEMENTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGIME FOR THE
ANTARCTIC, 11 (2000).
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regional custom might bind the rest of the global community.138 Article
38 of the Vienna Treaty provides that the principle of pacta tertiis (trea-
ties do not create obligations for non-parties) does not “preclude a rule
set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a custom-
ary rule of international law, recognized as such.”139
Recognition of the ATS as customary international law encounters
a fundamental difficulty. Custom must be generally accepted as a source of
international law.140 For at least thirty years, the international community
through the General Assembly has made clear its disapproval of the ATS
and its exclusionary nature.141 Although the ATS has fifty-three Consul-
tative and Non-Consultative Parties,142 there is not unanimous agree-
ment even among the Parties that the ATS is customary international
law and not only a treaty regime.143 The somewhat alarming conclusion
which follows is that the ATS does not in any way bind the states outside
of the ATS with respect to Antarctica.144 In other words, whatever obliga-
tions the ATS parties have, other states are free to utilize Antarctica in any
way they choose assuming no other independent treaty obligations limit
their activities such as the International Whaling Convention, UNCLOS,
MARPOL 73/78, or the London Dumping Convention.
B. Will the Treaty on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine
Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
Have Any Legal Effect in Antarctica’s Waters?
In January 2015, a United Nations Working Group had its final
meeting to consider marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.145
138 Id.
139 United Nations, supra note 128, at art. 38.
140 Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. 2 art. 38(1)(b) (discussing customary
international law).
141 Moritaka Hayashi, The Antarctic Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 275, 282–85 (1986) (discussing how the Treaty was “frequently criticized” for its
exclusive and secretive nature, largely when it comes to decision-making power).
142 SECRETARIAT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, Antarctic Treaty: The Antarctic Treaty,
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYS., https://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm [https://perma.cc/FRD6-9W7N].
143 Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or Purgatory of Am-
biguity, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 195, 195 (1985) (discussing how the Treaty is not “a clear
enforcement mechanism” or formal international organization “with legal personality”).
144 See Donald R. Rothwell, The Antarctic Treaty: 1961–1991 and Beyond, 14 SYDNEY L. REV.
62, 69 (1992).
145 Letter dated 13 February, 2015 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal
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It recommended formulation of a new treaty under UNCLOS.146 Accord-
ingly, in June of 2015, the General Assembly adopted a resolution147 calling
for a preparatory committee to draft a global treaty on the conservation
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national
jurisdiction (the BBNJ Treaty)148 in 2016, which was declared to be the
Year of the Whale by the Pacific Regional Environment Programme.149
Approximately half of the Earth’s surface are areas beyond national juris-
diction.150 One meeting in 2017 of the preparatory committee, when
concluded, will trigger a decision of the General Assembly on whether to
launch formal treaty negotiations.151 Thus far, informal discussion of cover-
age has centered on whether the Arctic Ocean areas will be a specific
subject of the BBNJ negotiations.152 The ATS designation of the Antarctic
Ross Sea as a specially protected area under the ATS may have intensi-
fied the call for specific Arctic consideration.153 It remains to be seen if
the international community will confront the ATS directly in the context
of negotiations.
Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/69/780 (Feb. 13, 2015),
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/158296/A_69_780-EN.pdf?sequence=3
&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/9WVB-EZ4V].
146 Id.
147 G.A. Res. 69/292 ¶ 1, supra note 11.
148 Id. at G.A. Res. 69/292(a).
149 Year of the Whale in the Pacific Islands 2016/2017 Background Information and Proposal
for Workshop, Circular 15/55 (Secretariat of the Pac. Reg’l Env’t Programme) Aug. 25,
2015, at 1.
150 Glen Wright & Julien Rochette, Sea Change: Negotiating a New Agreement on the Con-
servation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,
IDDRI, 1 (March 2016).
151 Id. at 2–3.
152 See generally Kamrul Hossain, Arctic Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction: Framing A Legally Binding MPA Protection?, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Aug. 31,
2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/14/arc tic-marine-biodiversity-areas
-beyond-national-jurisdiction-framing [https://perma.cc/4NUA-787Y].
153 Brian Clark Howard, World’s Largest Marine Reserve Created Off Antarctica, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 27, 2016), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/10/ross-sea-ma
rine-protected-area-antarctica/ [https://perma.cc/XP7M-HYUW]. Even within the protected
area, an excluded area remains open for lucrative Antarctic toothfish fishing, euphemis-
tically renamed as “Chilean Sea Bass.” Id. Continued fishing of the species in this limited
area was allowed despite the fact that the environmental damage from such fishing was
in part the incentive for designating the Ross Sea from additional exploitation.
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The Elusive Boundaries of Antarctica
The Boundaries of the ATS154
154 University of Texas Libraries, Antarctic Region, UNIV. TEX. AT AUSTIN (2001), http://
www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/antarctic_region_2000.jpg [https://perma
.cc/T6 NA-VLX2] (showing the boundaries/claims of Antarctica).
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The Antarctic Convergence155
155 Nigel Roberts, The Antarctic in Antarctica and New Zealand—Voyages of Discovery,
TE ARA—THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF N.Z. (2012), https://teara.govt.nz/en/map/37136/the-ant
arctic [https://perma.cc/83NS-MT4Z] (showing the Antarctic convergence).
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CCAMLR Boundaries156
156 Australian Government: Department of the Environment and Energy, Figure “showing
CCAMLR Convention area” in Success Combating Illegal Fishing, AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC
DIV.: LEADING AUSTRALIA’S ANTARCTIC PROGRAM (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.antarctica
.gov.au/news/2006/success-combating-illegal-fishing [https://perma.cc/4U9S-GUHZ]; Joshua
Stevens, Image Showing Antarctica and the Antarctic Sea Ice in Antarctic Sea Ice, NASA
(2016), https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/SeaIce/page4.php [https://perma.cc/G2
DC-35GU].
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The UNCLOS Boundaries with Territorial Claims157
157  Map 13567: Antarctica: Territorial Claims [Black and white], AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC
DATA CENTRE (2018), https://data.aad.gov.au/aadc/mapcat/display_map.cfm?map_id=13567
[https://perma.cc/VCA6-XAUG].
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The UNCLOS Boundaries Fluctuating158
The maps above delineate the differing boundaries of Antarctica
territorial and coastal claims, depending upon the legal regime setting such
boundaries. The first map shows the standard territorial vector-based
claims to Antarctic territory under the ATS.159 Under the ATS, coastal
water claims are simply a matter of drawing the triangular vector lines
from the South Pole outward for each claim. The inclusion of coastal waters
is incidental to the method chosen for defining the territorial claims. Thus,
Norway’s territorial and coastal waters claims remain undefined due to
its refusal to give any legal recognition to the vector approach which Russia
uses to Norway’s detriment in the Arctic.160 Moreover, overlapping territo-
rial claims create disputed boundaries even assuming the validity of the
vector approach. The second map shows the ecological delineation of the
158 Outer continental shelf in the Antarctic Treaty Area, GRID-ARENDAL: A CENTRE COLLABO-
RATING WITH UNEP (2014), http://old.grida.no/graphic.aspx?f=pubs/shelf/fig-14.jpg [https://
perma.cc/CP5S-8WKV].
159 University of Texas Libraries, supra note 154.
160 See Kurt M. Shusteritch, The Antarctic Treaty System: History, Substance, and Specula-
tion, 39 INT’L J. 800, 802 (1984).
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Arctic Ocean or the Antarctica Convergence where the Arctic Ocean
meets the warmer waters of the adjacent southern oceans, and the third
map illustrates how that corresponds to the ecosystem-based boundaries
under CCAMLR.161 The next map shows an approximation of the coastal
water claims assuming the validity of the territorial claims, entitling
each claimant to a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone,
and continental shelf.162 Once again, conflicting territorial claims cloud the
coastal boundaries even under the boundaries established by UNCLOS.163
The final map reflects a legal assessment of the territorial claims most
likely to merit legal recognition and the resultant coastal water bound-
aries.164 This approach shows a very fluctuating set of coastal boundaries
in which the high seas may in some instances start at the coastal base-
line where no territorial claims are valid to the standard high seas delinea-
tion of beyond 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline when such
territorial claims are recognized.165 Finally, if no territorial claims are
recognized on whatever legal analysis, the waters off Antarctica are by
default the high seas.166 For example, if the General Assembly’s categori-
zation of Antarctica as a “World Park” and the “common heritage of man-
kind” prevails, the waters would presumably be entirely the high seas.
Such a designation without further international agreement for regulation
would expose the Antarctic waters to free exploitation of its resources by
any state under the freedoms of the high seas.
CONCLUSION
The fragile ecosystem of Antarctica is subject to an equally fragile
legal regime. There are states that claim its territory but are going along,
for now, with the ATS.167 There are non-claimant states in the ATS which
do not recognize territorial claims but insist that the ATS controls the
global community as a whole.168 There are non-claimant states in the
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ATS that question the ATS and its global legal impact even while being
non-consultative parties in the ATS. There is presumably a majority of
States in the General Assembly which do not recognize either the territorial
claims or the legitimacy of the ATS as a globally binding legal regime.
The General Assembly approach at present creates another type of legal
vacuum for the Antarctic waters which opens them without further global
agreement to free exploitation as the high seas under UNCLOS. None of
these approaches is satisfactory or certain to continue indefinitely with
the increasing pressures to exploit natural resources wherever located.
Generally, the world community has been willing to tolerate the
ATS as long as resource exploitation was essentially banned, while assert-
ing its own claim to those resources whenever opened to exploitation. If
the Madrid Protocol had allowed for mining, as the failed CRAMRA did,
the uneasy truce between the ATS and the General Assembly would have
dissolved. With aggressive assertions of authority in the Arctic by Rus-
sia, internally the ATS is on fragile grounds of agreement.169 As difficult
procedurally as it is, the Madrid Protocol can be undone. If the interna-
tional community seeks to assume authority over the future of Antarctica,
it must first resolve the question of whether or not Antarctic resources
may be exploited, on land or in the coastal waters. If the consensus allows
for exploitation of coastal waters, the community would be wise to formu-
late a legal regime to do so similar to that formulated for the deep seabed.
Exploitation of resources on terra firma would be even more challenging
and with little or no guiding precedent. It should be assumed that the
changing climate and evolving technology will make Antarctic mineral
exploitation feasible and attractive at some point in the future, as fishing
has already begun in its waters.170 The only global consensus so far has
been to ignore the problem to procrastinate formulation of a solution. It
is unlikely as a political and legal matter that most states will accept as
the legal regime the exclusive ATS “club.” The treaty negotiations for areas
beyond national jurisdiction provide an opportunity for the global com-
munity to tackle the problems directly, as difficult as that will be. The
uneasy truce over Antarctica will only become more uneasy as the future
of the continent, and the planet, becomes more imperiled.
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